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CASES NOTED
ADMIRALTY - CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT
TORT-FEASORS IN NON-COLLISION CASES
A judgment was recovered against the defendant by an employee of
the third-party defendant for injuries sustained in a fall on the defendant's
ship while it was being repaired by the third-party defendant. In a suit for
contribution in the district court, the defendant recovered half the amount
of the judgment from the third-party defendant. The court of appeals
agreed that a right of contribution existed, but limited it to the amount that
the third-party defendant would have had to pay under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' Held, on certiorari, that in
admiralty there is no right of contribution among joint tort-feasors in non-
collision cases. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 72
Sup. Ct. 277 (1952).
The right to contribution anong joint tort-feasors has long existed in
the law of admiralty of the United States.2  Although the doctrine originally
was applied to collision cases,3 there was no express limitation to that
effect and it was soon expanded to embrace non-collision cases. 4  Indeed,
from the advent of the rule, the courts saw no reason, nor, apparently, did
they conceive of the idea that there should be a differentiation between the
two situations. 5
A mass of lower federal court decisions reiterates the rule that the
right to contribution exists in all manner of torts at admiralty. The only
1. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq. (1946).2. See Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F.2d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1945); TheAlabama, 92 U.S. 695 (1875); The Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 How. 170 (US. 1854).
3. Erie R.R .v. Erie & Western Transportation Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907); The
North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882); Tlie Alabama, 92 U.S. 695 (1875): The Catherine v.
Dickinson, 17 Ilow. 170 (U.S. 1854); The Mariska, 107 Fed. 989 (7th Cir. 1901),
reversing 100 Fed. 500 (N.D. 111. 1900); The Hudson, 15 Fed. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883),
4. The Jethou, 2 F.2d 287 (D. Ore. 1924).
5. In The Ita M. Hedges, 218 U.S. 264, 270 (1910), Mr. Justice Holmes pointed
out that the right to contribution was an integral part of the law of admiralty and drew
no distinction between different types of torts. "The right to contribution is a conse,
quence of the joint tort and attaches to the joint liability. Tlie right to contribution
belongs to the substantive law of the admiralty and is not a mere incident of any form
of procedure." 2 BENErCT, ADMIRALTY, § 353 (6th ed. 1950).
6. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Quinn Bros., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 212, 213 (D, Mass.
1950) (". . . the principle of contribution among joint tort-feasors . . . is a familiar
concept of martime law .... This principle has been applied not only to cases of injury
of property but also to cases of personal injury . . . and in particular to situations in
which indemnity or contribution was sought in cases involving personal injuries to steve-dores."); N.Y. & Puerto Rico S.S. Co. v. Lee's Lighters, Inc., 48 F.2d 372 (E.D.N.Y.1930); Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
The Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
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limitation is that of common sense and general tort law that "[f]or a right
of contribution to accrue between tort-feasors, they must be joint wrongdoers
in the sense that their tort or torts have imposed a common liability upon
them to the party injured,"' and that for the wrongdoers to be considered
joint tort-feasors they must contribute simultaneously to the injury; there
cannot be two or more independent acts.8 In the only case involving con-
tribution in a non-collision situation considered by the United States Su-
preme Court prior to the instant case, contribution was denied solely be-
cause of a contract between the parties limiting the liability.9 The lan-
guage of the decision makes it clear that, had there been no such contract,
the usual rules of contribution in admiralty would have been applied.' 0 At
least one federal court has held that this case is one upholding the right to
contribution in non-collision cases."
The rationale of the instant case is that the court should not "fashion
new judicial rules of contribution," 2-' but await legislative action. The rea-
son ascribed by the Court for its position is the presence of the various con-
flicting interests of ship owners, dry dock, stevedoring and insurance
companies.
The fear of fashioning new rules would appear to be a little tardy since
it has been the practice of the lower courts, at least since 1924, to allow
contribution in this type of case.13 Indeed, the Supreme Court overlooks
its own admission in the Porello case, albeit in the dictum, of the existence
of this right. In effect, what the Court has done, then, is to fashion a new
judicial rule through its denial of a remedy which has been available in
admiralty for the past twenty-eight years; "the well established rule of con-
tribution between joint tort-feasors."''14 It has overruled and reversed both
the lower courts and itself, substituting confusion for what was, until now,
considered a settled point of maritime law.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW - CONTEMPT
A presentment to the Supreme Court of New Jersey by a county bar
association committee on the unauthorized practice of law asked that de-
7. Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947). RE-
STATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 86 (1937).
8. United States v. Rothschild International Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th
Cir. 1950); The Mars, 9 F.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
9. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
10. Id. at 458 (" . . . the usual rule in admiralty, in the absence of contract, is for
each joint toitfeasor to pay the injured party a moiety of the damages. ... ).
11. Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
12. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 72 Sup. Ct. 277, 280
(1952).
13. The Jethou, 2 F.2d 287 (D. Ore. 1924).
14. Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
